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The International Monetary Fund’s structure and rules are based on the quota 
system that was constructed when the Fund was set up in 1946. Quotas affect 
contributions and resource availability at the Fund, access to resources, the 
distribution of Special Drawing Rights, and voting rights.  Despite periodic 
reviews and modifications, the quota system has gradually been eroded and 
undermined.  The fundamental problem is that a single system is attempting to 
serve four separate and incompatible functions.  We illustrate how this erosion 
has taken place, and how an unreformed quota system will compromise the 
future operations of the IMF and the international monetary and financial 
system.  Although the difficulties associated with reforming quotas are myriad 
and complex, the legacy of an unreformed quota system may be profoundly 
undesirable. We argue that a refined IMF structure must accommodate a 
clearer separation of a member’s contributions to the IMF, its access to IMF 
resources, and its voting rights at the institution.    3
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Among the most fundamental issues currently facing the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) are its role as a financing and adjustment institution, its economic crisis 
management duties, and its own internal governance. All of these issues have featured 
prominently in recent discussions about the IMF and have resulted in lively, if not 
down right heated, debate. Reports such as that of the Meltzer Commission (IFIAC, 
2000) have received close attention not only amongst policy-makers and academics 
but also within the media. Critical commentaries of the Fund’s role in crisis countries 
have generated wide interest and have been latched onto by those opposed to certain 
aspects of globalization. 
1 
  One central element of the Fund’s operations, however, has avoided this 
upsurge in public interest and inspection.  Despite its pivotal role in determining the 
IMF’s governance structure, resource capacity, and lending behaviour, membership 
quotas have attracted little attention outside of the Fund’s own formal internal review 
process. It has been only relatively occasionally that the topic has cropped up in the 
academic literature, (see, for example, Bird, 1987.) More recently, however, and 
particularly in the context of governance, IMF quotas have received closer inspection 
(Buira, 2002, Kelkar et al, 2004, and Kenen et al, 2004).  Obscured by seemingly 
complex equations and often mired in important but technical debates about the merits 
of different measures of aggregate income or balance of payments variance, it is easy 
to see how the topic would test the attention of even seasoned IMF watchers.  And yet 
quotas are presented by the Fund as its ‘building blocks’ (IMF Survey, 2002). Are 
IMF quotas good or bad building blocks? 
                                                           
1 Bird (2001) provides a summary and discussion of the principal issues involved in the current debate 
about the IMF.   4
This paper focuses on the practical and political economy dimensions of IMF 
quotas and their reform.  As indicated by recent experience with the Twelfth General 
Review of Quotas, in which a consensus for change failed to emerge, the question of 
quotas is at the heart of institutional reform at the Fund, and consequently it is 
politically highly charged.  Central to the debate over quotas is the fact that they 
attempt to play multiple roles, requiring any reform to strike a balance between 
conflicting ideals and opposing constituents.  We examine the various roles played by 
the quota system, identify some of its deficiencies, and illustrate how the linkages 
between its functions both necessitate and confound the reform process.  We then 
examine whether and how the reform impasse may be overcome, arguing that it is 
necessary to contemplate fairly profound changes to the Fund’s institutional structure.  
  The lay out of the paper is as follows. By way of background, section 2 
provides a brief history and summary of IMF quotas. Section 3 examines two of the 
three key roles for quotas: determining the Fund’s resource base and its members’ 
borrowing capacities.  It also briefly discusses the role of quotas in allocating Special 
Drawing Rights (SDRs). Section 4 investigates the implications of quotas for the 
governance of the IMF.  Section 5 examines the linkages between these functions and 
the implications for reform from a political economy perspective.  Section 6 offers a 
few concluding remarks. 
 
2. IMF QUOTAS: THE BACKGROUND 
 
Quotas are significant to the Fund’s operations because they affect voting rights, 
subscriptions, the size of ordinary drawing rights and access to special facilities, as   5
well as the distribution of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
2 However from the outset 
of the Fund’s operations in 1946 the formula used to calculate quotas was spurious, 
since agreement had already been reached about the total amount of quotas and the 
relative sizes of the quotas for the most powerful countries. A trial-and-error process 
was then used to devise a formula – the Bretton Woods formula- that generated the 
desired results.
3 
 In the early 1960s the Bretton Woods formula was re-specified, and 
four supplementary formulas were added in an attempt to reflect, among other things, 
the financing needs of small primary commodity exporting nations.  In addition, the 
equations were calculated using two different sets of data to take into account more 
subtle and improved current account balance of payments measures.  Thus, from 1963 
until 1983 the ‘calculated quotas’ were based on a fairly complex relationship 
between ten different equations.
4  In 1983 the system currently used for calculating 
quotas came into effect, modifying the equations once more and eliminating the five 
not based on improved current account data.   
  Following the Eleventh General Review completed in 1998, and reflecting the 
concerns of some of the Fund’s principal shareholders, an independent review of 
quota formulas was undertaken by a panel of eight external experts. This Quota 
Formula Review Group (QFRG) submitted its report in 2000.
5    However, its 
                                                           
2 SDRs are the IMF’s unit of account linked to four major currencies and also constitutes a financial 
resource created by the IMF and distributed, on occasion, to its members. Members of the IMF pay 
subscriptions equivalent to their quotas. Up to 25 per cent of the subscription is paid in the form of 
international reserve assets specified by the IMF (SDRs or widely accepted foreign reserves currencies 
such as US dollars, Euros, Japanese yen or pounds sterling) with the rest being paid in the member’s 
own currency. Each member of the IMF has 250 basic votes plus one additional vote for each SDR 
100,000 of quota. Access limits to IMF resources via the range of facilities that it offers are based in 
part on quotas.  Similarly, allocations of SDRs are set in proportion to member countries’ quotas. 
3 See Mikesell (1994) for a fascinating first-hand account.  Lister (1984: 53) points out that even after 
these computational gymnastics the deviation of actual from the computed quotas were enormous, with 
the highest difference being seventy-five percent.  
4 The final calculated quota was the higher of the revised original Bretton Woods formula and the 
average of the two lowest of the additional formulae.  See IMF (2001: 7-8, and Annex II). 
5 For a more detailed and technical review of quota issues, see IMF 2000 and IMF 2000a.  Jha and 
Saggar (2000) provide a valuable and more independent overview and suggest their own alternative 
formula.   6
recommendations, which involved adopting a much-simplified formula, based on 
GDP averaged over three years and external variability comprising both current 
receipts and capital flows, were not warmly received (i.e. effectively rejected) by the 
Fund’s Executive Board which agreed to “carry forward the work of the panel” (IMF 
2000). Consideration of alternative formulas has constituted a part of the Fund’s work 
programme since then.
6 But there is no suggestion that consensus is any closer. 
  In addition to occasional refinements to the quota formulas, which affect 
calculated quotas, the ‘actual’ quotas themselves also undergo frequent review and 
adjustment. These can occur because of special events that need to be accommodated, 
such as the accession to membership of the IMF, or because of economic 
developments that dramatically alter the financial significance of a country, as in the 
case of Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.  In these cases it is often just the quota for a single 
country or small group of countries that is adjusted.  
More generally, however, there are periodic reviews of the full range of quotas 
that take place at least once every five years, of which the Twelfth General Review is 
the most recent.  These reviews are the mechanism by which major changes in actual 
quotas are made, occasionally leading to substantial changes in total quotas as well as 
to a realignment of relative shares.   Of the General Quota Reviews that there have 
been the first, second, third, tenth and twelfth (concluded in 2003) did not recommend 
any enlargement in overall quotas.  The remaining eight (including one extraordinary 
review in 1958/9) recommended quota increases averaging just over 44 percent, with 
a range from 30.7 percent (1965) to 60.7 percent (1959). When quotas have been 
generally increased, this has usually been based in part on existing actual quotas and 
in part on the calculated quotas derived from the quota formulas. 
                                                           
6 See IMF 2001 and 2001a.  
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  In terms of institutional governance, individual country quotas are the major 
determinant of relative voting power at the IMF.  Furthermore, individual quotas 
affect countries’ contributions and access to IMF resources, while collectively they 
determine the aggregate resource base of the IMF.  As a consequence, quotas have 
important political economy dimensions, and frequently generate vigorous debate.  
  The struggle over quota assignments is well illustrated by the recent Twelfth 
Review.  During the course of this review the Fund failed to come up with a definitive 
solution to the quota formula problem, and simultaneously failed to reach a consensus 
regarding a change in total subscriptions. Despite seminars, staff papers and the work 
of its own QFRG, the IMF’s Executive Board failed to reach a conclusion at its 
October 2001 and June 2002 meetings.  Indeed, an important feature of the Board’s 
discussions of quotas has been the wide divergence of opinion.  
Disagreements can exist because the formal equations are not the objective 
and authoritative or, for that matter, legally binding (Lister, 1984: 54) determinant of 
quotas.  The Fund’s major financial contributors have not been prepared to commit to 
a completely objective and binding formula for quota calculations.  In the context of 
the Twelth General Review, the US was reluctant to expand the resource base of the 
IMF or to see its share of votes decline. The US view, albeit somewhat caricatured, is 
that private capital markets should be the principal source of financing for emerging 
economies and that the IMF should not be lending long term to developing countries. 
Indeed, while conceding to a quota increase at the end of the 1990s, the US Congress 
made their acceptance conditional on the establishment of a commission to examine 
the role of the IMF and other IFIs. Congress selected as the Chairman of the 
Commission someone who had publicly expressed doubts about the continuing need 
for the IMF. European economies have generally been associated with a more   8
accommodating view but were reluctant to cede their influence. Developing countries 
would have welcomed an increase in their share of total votes and an enhanced role in 
IMF governance as well as greater access to IMF resources, but might have been 
unenthusiastic about increasing their obligations to the Fund. Moreover, many of the 
poorest countries draw from the Fund under the concessionary Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility and the resources for this do not come from quota-based 
subscriptions. An increase in quota assignments may thus have required these 
countries to contribute more in the form of subscriptions without really affecting the 
resource base from which they usually draw.   A critical problem is that the quota 
system is simply charged with too many, potentially inconsistent, functions. We 
examine these in the following two sections. 
 
3.  RESOURCE ADEQUACY AND ACCESS  
 
Quotas affect (but no longer wholly determine) each country’s access to Fund 
resources on an individual basis. Collectively the subscriptions based on them provide 
a significant proportion of the resources available to the IMF through its General 
Resources Account (GRA), though these funds are not used for its concessionary 
lending window.  Thus quotas arguably operate on both the supply and demand sides 
of IMF resource use, with critical implications for resource adequacy.  
  In identifying the tensions that have emerged in the IMF’s quota system, it is 
instructive to examine how access to IMF resources has evolved.  The IMF was 
initially established in the form of a credit union where most members were seen as 
being equally likely to require the kind of temporary financial assistance that the IMF 
was designed to provide.  The theory and early practice of operating the Bretton   9
Woods fixed exchange rate system suggested that wealthier industrial members were 
as likely to draw on IMF resources as the poorer members.  Clearly the amounts 
drawn by the former would be larger due to their relative economic size, but then their 
contributions would also be larger.  In fact, from 1947 to 1978, the single largest 
purchaser of IMF resources was the UK, accounting for over a quarter of all 
purchases. Industrial countries accounted for over 60 percent of all purchases. As 
there were mechanisms to encourage economic adjustment built into both IMF 
conditionality (as it eventually emerged) and the fixed exchange rate system, no 
country was envisaged as being perpetually a net contributor or client. Balance of 
payments problems were viewed as cyclical rather than endemic. The exception to 
this rule was the United States, whose dominant role as a supplier of finance was 
incorporated into the IMF’s financial and governance structure. There were various 
reasons for the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971-73 (these are 
summarised in Bird, 1985) but amongst them was the failure was to accommodate a 
balance of payments adjustment process for the US.    
  It took only a few years for the post-Bretton Woods IMF to become 
bifurcated.  After 1976, industrial countries became absent from the list of credit-
tranche agreement clients.
7  Effectively there emerged two types of members: rich 
country ‘lenders’ and poor country ‘borrowers’.  This division made the quota 
structure increasingly untenable and unsuitable as a means of determining 
simultaneously contributions and access. It also inevitably complicated questions of 
                                                           
7 The first 25 percent of a country’s quota, called the ‘reserve tranche’, can be accessed by a country 
without negotiating an IMF program.  The remaining seventy five percent of the quota is paid in the 
country’s domestic currency, and for most developing and emerging market countries is thus not very 
useful for dealing with balance of payments problems. Loans of hard currencies above the reserve 
tranche amount are considered to be from the ‘upper tranche purchases’ that are not accessible without 
a negotiated program.   10
governance as well. Lenders may be expected to adopt different positions than debtors 
and will be unwilling to cede control to them.  
  In practice the IMF accommodated this division by breaking, or at least 
bending, the connection between quotas and borrowing limits.  This innovation 
reflected the increased financial volatility that emerged after the early 1970s.  While 
quotas had initially been based on national income, reserves, imports, export variance, 
and trade dependence, actual balance of payments structures and imbalances were 
often more dependent on financial flows that were not part of the quota calculation.  
Countries with substantial current account deficits, the presumed trigger for an IMF 
agreement under the Bretton Woods system, could avoid crises by relying on private 
or non-IMF official financing.  However, when these alternative sources dried up, 
countries were forced to ask the IMF to fill a far larger financing gap than the quota 
structure had foreseen.  The IMF responded to this new situation by increasingly 
lending above the original 100 percent of quota limit.  
  The crises in emerging markets in the 1990s illustrated just how disconnected 
the relationship had become.  It became difficult to maintain the pretence of carefully 
planned and regulated credit limits, or to claim that quotas were appropriate to the 
task.
8 Beginning with the Tequila Crisis in 1994/95, financial crises triggered large 
IMF programs that bore little connection to the original lending limits. Funding 
requirements were only loosely linked to the volatility measures on the current 
account that were represented in the quota calculations. The clearest signal of the 
break between quotas and resource access came in the form of the Supplemental 
Reserve Facility, established at the end of 1997 in the midst of the Asian Crisis, which 
had no resource use limits linked to quotas.  
                                                           
8  IMF (1998) lays out very clearly just how complex the IMF’s lending facility structure became, and 
how lending under these facilities were linked (or not) to quotas.   11
In an extensive review of access to GRA resources the IMF (2003: 3,6) still 
claimed that in the period after 1994 over 90 percent of arrangements fell within the 
normal access limits. But 85 percent of the Fund’s commitments at the end of 2002 
were concentrated in five arrangements with exceptional access.  Of these cases, 
Argentina’s use was over 5 times its total quota.  Turkey borrowed resources over 15 
times its quota (IMF 2002b: 166-169).  Thus, while claiming that quotas remained 
relevant, the Fund in fact adopted a pragmatic response to the borrowing needs of its 
members, unconstrained by quotas.  
  The fact that standard quota calculations have become completely inadequate 
as a measure of the real borrowing needs of members is reflected in the reforms 
suggested by the QFRG.  The QFRG argued that financial openness and volatility 
should be part of the quota formula. However, it proved easier to acknowledge the 
need for reform in principle than to come to an agreement on the specifics of reform.  
Moreover, the formula revision favoured by the QFRG highlighted the fact that 
reforming quotas to reflect the needs of its borrowing members necessarily implied 
unnecessary changes in access for advanced countries for whom IMF support is 
irrelevant. More importantly, however, quota changes to reflect borrowing needs 
imply more contentious changes to individual country subscriptions to the Fund, 
overall resource levels in the GRA, and, perhaps most significantly, voting power. 
  The absence of formal access limits that has emerged as a pragmatic response, 
however, must also be regarded with some concern.  For as long as they operated, 
limits provided greater predictability in terms of financing packages, eased resource 
management problems for the Fund, and may have played a useful role in sending 
appropriate signals to financial markets.  They may also have constrained the Fund’s 
vulnerability to political manipulation both by key shareholders and large borrowers.   12
Without a credible mechanism for denying exceptionally large loans, the IMF can be 
subjected to greater pressure to lend liberally to favoured nations, as perhaps the loans 
to Argentina and Turkey illustrate. The debacle between the IMF and Argentina in the 
early 2000s illustrates, however, that when these loans become too large the IMF is 
compromised in its ability to disengage from a program for fear of jeopardising its 
portfolio.  
9 
  Moreover, the quota system should have helped ensure that the Fund had 
sufficient resources to meet the demand from countries in balance of payments 
difficulties. If access limits are relaxed, what happens when the demand for IMF 
resources exceeds the supply of resources provided by quota-based subscriptions?     
The chances of this happening may be minimised in as much as the demanders of 
IMF resources are developing and emerging economies whereas the suppliers are 
advanced economies. But large loans to emerging economies can strain the IMF’s 
liquidity and compromise the Fund’s ability to handle financial crises without 
supplementary bilateral financing, thereby politicising a process that was supposed to 
have been institutionalised.  
In response to real or potential shortages, the IMF has made alternative 
arrangements to increase its resources beyond those generated by quotas. These 
arrangements include the General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and the New 
Arrangements to Borrow (NAB), which provide a means of supplementing IMF 
resources by borrowing from wealthier nations deemed sufficiently sound financially. 
The IMF also has the right to borrow from private markets, though it has never 
exercised this (see Bird and Rowlands, 2001).    
                                                           
9 Excessive lending also damages the IMF’s reputation and has wider implications for international 
finance. In the case of the Argentina program, private lenders have challenged the preferred creditor 
status of the IMF, presumably because they see reckless IMF lending as jeopardising their own 
repayment prospects.   13
In theory the IMF could also seek to enhance its resources through the 
allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).  However, the initial idea that SDRs 
would become the principal reserve asset in the international financial system, and 
would be created on a regular basis to meet systemic reserve needs, has not 
materialised. National currencies, and in particular the US dollar, have continued to 
perform the role of the principal international reserve asset, and flexible exchange 
rates, combined with increased private capital flows, have undermined the need for 
SDRs in a systemic role. Regular allocations of SDRs have not occurred. 
Moreover, SDRs were originally allocated on the basis of quotas since these 
were assumed to stand as a proxy for the demand to hold reserves. The implication 
was that countries would hold on to the SDRs they were allocated. In practice, poor 
countries have generally spent them and richer countries have generally acquired 
them. Thus the theoretical justification for using quotas as the basis for SDR 
allocation turned out to be misplaced. Some observers have suggested that SDRs 
should be allocated more exclusively to low income countries to provide them with 
additional financial assistance, breaking away from the use of quotas (Bird, 1994). 
Others have simply viewed the role of quotas in determining allocations as irrelevant 
given the severely diminished role of SDRs.  Having been overtaken by innovations 
in the international financial system, and crippled by conflict over their distribution, 
SDRs cannot be seen as a realistic means of supplementing the Fund’s resource base. 
  So are IMF resources adequate or inadequate? G-24 publications regularly 
emphasise the decline in IMF quotas relative to world trade, falling from 17 per cent 
of total imports in 1950 to 4 per cent in 2000 (Buira, 2002, 2004).  The IMF’s 
management sometimes alludes to a trend towards inadequacy; though some argue 
                                                                                                                                                                      
   14
that this represents the bureaucratic pursuit of self-interest (Vaubel, 1991, 1994. 
1996).  In February 2002 the Fund’s Executive Board requested its Treasurer’s 
Department to quantify resource adequacy (IMF, 2002a).  In general its report 
identifies a declining trend in resource adequacy since 1972, as measured by the ratio 
of total quotas to the GDP of members, calculated quotas, current payments, reserves, 
and the variability of current receipts.  The report also notes that a similar conclusion 
is reached when other measures (such as Gross Financing Need) are used.   
Furthermore, the report claims that the unpredictability of claims on IMF resources 
(IMF 2002a, point 31, and Rowlands, 1998) and the increase in private capital flows 
makes the current resource base too low to handle potential risks.  Consequently, and 
with specific reference to the decline in the ratio of quotas to members’ GDPs, the 
report recommends an increase in quotas to ensure that the IMF’s own resources are 
adequate to meet the challenges of managing the international financial system.  
  However, there are counter arguments. The IMF recognizes that its immediate 
resource adequacy (‘liquidity’) is linked to ‘usable resources’; the holdings of 
currencies of members deemed to be financially strong, minus current resource 
commitments.  Its own calculated liquidity ratio (the ratio of usable resources to its 
liquid liabilities) shows high volatility but no declining trend over the period 1984-
2002 (IMF, 2002b). 
10   
  Figure 1 shows the ratio of industrial country quotas (a proxy for usable 
resources) to various current account balance of payments measures, including world 
trade (total world exports), the total of all developing country current account deficits, 
and the total of all developing country current account deficits above five percent of 
GDP. Aside from the large drop in the ratio in the mid-1970s, there has been no 
                                                           
10 The calculation has only been made since 1984, however, so a longer time series is not available.   15
discernible trend thereafter. Furthermore, the underlying question about the IMF’s 
resource adequacy is ‘adequate for what?’ However,  it is perhaps unsurprising that 
G24, envisaging an enhanced lending role for the Fund, also views IMF resources as 
inadequate, whereas the US and others who envisage a truncated lending role view its 
resources as adequate or even excessive. Much will depend on one’s perception of the 
relative importance of market failure in the context of private capital markets, and 
institutional failure in terms of the way in which the Fund conducts its affairs. The 
issues are not straightforward and we do not examine them here. For a recent review 
of them see Bird and Joyce (2001).  
Where does this leave us? The de facto separation of its members into 
‘lenders’ and ‘borrowers’ has eroded the original credit union nature of the IMF; 
actual access is no longer related to actual contributions.  The modifications that have 
taken place to deal with resource constraints and access limits have occurred in a 
pragmatic, but largely piecemeal way.  The dangers of this response are twofold. 
First, dealing with resource constraints through ad hoc borrowing agreements and 
bilateral contributions introduces delays and additional political constraints on IMF 
operations.  These restrictions may be particularly costly during crises.  Second, it 
complicates resource management and accountability. 
  The overall conclusion with regards the adequacy of the IMF’s resources and 
access to them cannot be separated from the broader debate about the role of the 
Fund. However, little objective support for the quota system emerges. Apart from the 
fact that actual quotas have deviated sharply for those calculated on the basis of the 
quota formulas, they have failed to generate the access to IMF resources deemed 
necessary in large crisis country cases. They have failed to ensure that the Fund has 
adequate resources in the sense that there have been efforts to supplement them, and   16
they have failed to generate the distribution of SDRs that was either originally 
intended or that some critics would favour. Reforming the quota system to meet the 
imperatives of access and resource management, however, would have implications 
for the governance of the IMF as well. In order to understand why the quota structure 
has not been modified in the light of its obvious financial shortcomings, it is 
necessary to understand the political dimensions of quotas.  
  
4. IMF AND GOVERNANCE 
 
The IMF’s organisational structure is currently based on quotas.  The ultimate 
decision-making body at the IMF is the Board of Governors, comprising a governor 
(and an alternate) for each member country.  Each member has 250 ‘basic’ votes plus 
one vote for every 100,000 SDRs of their quota.
11 The distribution of votes is shown 
in Table 1. While the 250 basic votes technically generate a bias in favour of small 
countries, this does nothing in practice to reduce the dominance of the advanced 
economies in overall voting rights. Basic votes as a percentage of total votes have 
fallen from about 10 per cent up until the mid-1970s to barely 2 per cent in 2002, thus 
reducing the voting power of small, developing countries. 
  The day-to-day running of the IMF is managed by its Executive Board, 
consisting of 24 members elected in ‘constituencies’.  Eight of these consist of single 
countries that have their own permanent seat (United States, Japan, Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, China, and Russia).  The remaining countries are 
organized into sixteen multiple-country constituencies.  Of these, five are dominated 
by a single member with more than half of the combined votes of the constituency 
                                                           
11 Thus, for example, Angola, with a quota of SDR 286,300,000 has 3113 votes (2863+250). 
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(Brazil, Canada, India, Italy and Switzerland).   Four have either clearly dominant 
members (Belgium, Netherlands, Argentina) or a reasonably dominant member 
(Australia). The remaining seven constituencies have a greater dispersion of votes 
amongst members. It is through their dominance of the multiple constituencies that 
the influence of European countries within the Fund is further enhanced (Kenen et al, 
2004).  
  This governance structure is more complex in reality. Informally the IMF’s 
decisions are made by consensus with few actual votes taken. On the one hand, the 
apparently smooth operation of the Fund in most decision-making areas may be 
attributable to the common beliefs and attitudes of its Governors and Board members 
given their origins in central banks and finance departments.   On the other hand, the 
consensus principle does not mean strict unanimity.  As Van Houtven (2002: 23) 
argues, consensus is determined by the Chair of the Board, and is meant to ensure that 
all key players and groups are broadly accepting of a decision.  This consensus is also 
in part engineered inasmuch as technical aspects of debates are shaped by IMF staff 
who are clearly aware of the distribution of influence and power in the Executive 
Board. Moreover, the constituencies that contain both developed and developing 
countries may help to forge a consensus between initially opposed groups (Van 
Houtven, 2002: 68) although they could also, in principle, be a conduit for coercion. 
However, while the nature of the consensus process and extent to which it constrains 
actual decision-making is largely unknown (De Gregorio et al., 1999: 80), it may be 
safe to conclude that it cannot be entirely divorced from underlying voting power. 
Consensus is facilitated by the fact that the formal rules could be invoked.  For most 
decisions a simple majority is sufficient.    18
For strategically more important decisions, however, special majorities are 
required.
12  It is in these areas that the element of power embedded in voting shares is 
most apparent. Two majority levels for key decisions are used: one at 70 per cent and 
the other at 85 percent. Quota changes are among the decisions governed by the 85 
percent requirement.
13 In fact this was the first key decision singled out for a special 
majority in the initial conception of the IMF (Lister, 1984: 82). The only country to 
wield an individual veto over these most critical changes is currently, and 
traditionally, the United States with just over 17 percent of the votes, although, as a 
group, the European Union also has an effective veto. Despite the general use of 
consensual decision-making, the contentious nature of quotas is therefore easily 
understood in terms of the formal voting rights that underpin the IMF as an 
organisation. 
         The politics of IMF governance creates various dilemmas. Given they represent 
85 per cent of the total membership of the Fund, developing countries believe that 
they have an inappropriately small voice within the institution. As noted above, the 
emphasis on consensual decision-taking is not a substitute for voting rights. This line 
of argument has been clearly articulated by G-24, where it is suggested that the bias in 
favour of advanced countries undermines the legitimacy and representativeness, as 
well as ultimately the effectiveness of the IMF, since the majority of members feel 
that they exert insufficient influence over the Fund’s operations (Buira, 2004). But the 
arguments have also been endorsed outside the G-24 (see Kenen et al, 2004). 
Advanced countries point out that actual quotas disproportionately favour developing 
countries by comparison with the calculated quotas, and even developing countries 
may be wary of increasing their voting rights if this simultaneously encourages 
                                                           
12 See Lister (1984) for a discussion of how these special majorities have evolved.  
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advanced economies to become any further disengaged from the IMF, bypassing the 
Fund in favour of other decision-making bodies that they dominate, such as G7. The 
external review of quotas, for which developing countries pushed, recommended a 
new formula that would have increased the voting share of advanced economies. With 
increasing membership, advanced countries have sought to retain their veto and their 
powerful position within the governance of the IMF by manipulating the majorities 
required for key decisions. It is not therefore the objectivity of the quota system that 
determines the governance of the IMF but rather power politics. The quota system has 
simply been the instrument through which the power politics has been played out. 
  The IMF governance structure and reform process allows past political 
influence to become perpetuated within and through the Fund. Consequently the 
Fund’s political structure puts at risk the institution’s role in international financial 
governance. This danger is most clearly seen in the frequent abandonment of the IMF 
as the venue of choice in discussions relating to international financial reform. This 
process is especially true when the financial system faces unprecedented events, such 
as the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system, the debt crisis, or other financial 
crises.  The Financial Stability Forum, G-20, and the plethora of discussion groups 
and arrangements associated with the Bank for International Settlements, all attest to 
the perceived deficiencies of the IMF as a forum for discussing, and sometimes 
overseeing, fundamental reform.
14  
So governance at the IMF also appears to be far from ideal, certainly in terms of 
criteria such as legitimacy, representativeness and accountability, and is in as much 
                                                                                                                                                                      
13  For a list of decisions governed by special majority, see De Gregorio et al. 1999: 80-81. 
14 In the case of the G-20, for example, it was seen as a necessary development given the perceived 
lack of legitimacy for the G-7 in dealing with fundamental questions of international economic and 
financial management (see the G-20 website). The perceived need was to construct a forum that 
balanced the voices of advanced and developing countries. In the end, however, the composition of the   20
need of reform as the Fund’s financial operations. The concern is that in remedying 
these governance-related deficiencies, the future effectiveness of the Fund may be 
endangered. Although effectiveness may also be impaired if developing countries feel 
under-represented. As Van Houtven (2002: 8) points out, “there is no quota formula 
that is sensible from a financial perspective and that would also solve the governance 
issue”. What has emerged is an ad hoc compromise in which the politics of IMF 
governance drives the quota system and the economic consequences of this are then 
handled by expediency. Is it possible to do better than this?  
 
5. REFORMING IMF QUOTAS: BROAD PRINCIPLES 
 
There is no simple solution to the reform of quotas. There will be underlying conflicts 
of interest, and progress will depend on compromise. Given the multiplicity of roles 
performed by quotas, it is not surprising that consensus for reforming the quota 
system has been impossible to achieve. The system initially balanced the 
responsibilities and privileges of IMF members. With the division of this membership 
into those that borrow and those that provide resources, this balance disappeared. In 
some cases individual countries must weigh up the potentially contradictory effects of 
a quota increase on their contributions of hard currency on the one hand, and their 
nominal access to resources on the other. An increase in the share of developing 
country quotas would increase their relative voting rights but also their obligations.  
The lender-borrower fault lines that generate tension over resource provision and 
access largely coincide with divisions over governance and international financial 
management. Despite the sometimes significant differences within these two broad 
groups of members, problems with the quota structure have increasingly become 
                                                                                                                                                                      
G-20 was remarkably similar to that of the IMF’s Executive Board, which was clearly dismissed as an   21
defined as a zero-sum game based on differentiated roles and relative power. Such 
fundamental conflict within the decision-making structure of the IMF has prevented 
meaningful restructuring and is likely to lead to a continuing reform impasse. Can the 
impasse be overcome? Without proposing specific and detailed reforms, it may be 
useful to identify some broad principles upon which reform may be based. These 
principles are hardly new. They were, for example, enunciated and examined in some 
detail by one of us in the 1980s (Bird, 1987). More recently the same basic ideas have 
been reaffirmed by others (see, for example, Kelkar et al, 2004). 
  If we take as a starting point the IMF’s mandate to promote international 
monetary and financial stability, it is possible to identify some of the factors that need 
to underpin its structure.  Fund resources need to be adequate to handle its financing 
responsibilities, with each member’s obligations being grounded in their capacity to 
provide these resources. Access to IMF resources, and by extension SDR distribution, 
however, should reflect financial needs.  Finally, governance must be such as to allow 
all members to feel that their views are taken into account and represented, but at the 
same time must be sensitive to both financial and political power and the need for 
effective operation.  
  
Subscriptions and Resource Adequacy  
A member’s subscription should reflect its ability to provide resources and should be 
firmly based on wealth. Beneath some level of GDP per capita, poor countries could 
either be exempt from making subscriptions to the Fund altogether or could be asked 
to make only nominal contributions in terms of their own domestic currencies. Paying 
such a subscription might make them more committed to the institution but could 
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create additional domestic fiscal problems. Poor countries are by definition short of 
foreign exchange and it may seem illogical that they have to contribute it to the Fund 
in exchange for access to credit. Therefore, in terms of providing useful resources, 
while minimizing resource burdens on the poor, GDP could serve as the sole or at 
least the primary determinant of contributions.
15  
In terms of designing a subscription system, it may be useful to think of three 
groups of member countries. One group consisting of relatively poor countries should 
not be required to make any subscription in the form of hard currency. At the other 
end is the group of wealthy industrial countries that have not made any significant 
drawing on the Fund for over twenty-five years
16; their contributions should constitute 
the vast majority of the IMF’s resources. A third group lies between these two; it 
consists of countries within the income range in which occasional (and occasionally 
very large) drawings from the IMF occur. These countries could provide an 
intermediate level of financing, including hard currencies.     
  A related issue in re-structuring subscriptions to the IMF is to determine the 
overall amount of resources that the Fund needs. With a link to GDP, contributions 
would automatically rise in step with global economic growth. However, this might 
not always guarantee that the Fund would have ‘adequate’ resources. But, as noted 
earlier, determining ‘adequacy’ requires a clear definition of the role of the IMF.  Is it 
an adjustment or a financing institution? What is its role in the context of crises? 
  Should the IMF have enough resources on a permanent basis to handle crises 
that only occur periodically, or should the Fund’s resource base be temporarily 
expanded as needed through the GAB, NAB or private borrowing? If resources are 
                                                           
15 There is still a technical question of which GDP measure to use, noting that  purchasing power parity 
adjustments tend to increase the measured GDP of poor countries (Buira, 2002, Kelkar et al, 2004).   23
permanently in place, some may fear that the IMF will push loans, especially if 
institutional welfare depends on the quantity of lending. On the other hand, a delayed 
response to crisis may mean that it is managed less efficiently. 
  It is reasonably easy to deal with the resource provisioning of the IMF while 
minimizing the burden of membership on poorer members. By manipulating the level 
and allocation of quotas, and the proportion of quotas paid in domestic currency, it is 
possible to generate any combination of IMF resource levels, relative voting shares, 
and access for countries that need to borrow.  But identifying an adequate resource 
base first requires a consensus about the role of the Fund, which in turn affects 
political considerations and questions of resource access.  
 
Access 
Should the IMF be a fully-fledged international lender of last resort? Should it 
completely fill the financial vacuum created when there are outflows of private 
capital? These questions strike at the very heart of the debate over the Fund’s role and 
it is impossible to supply a definitive statement about access to IMF resources until 
they are answered.  
To fulfil its current Articles, the IMF must ensure that access depends on 
balance of payments need. To all intents and purposes, however, the IMF has already 
broken the connection between quotas and access.  The question is therefore whether 
retaining the notion of quota-based access limits has any value, or should each case be 
decided on its own merits?  
Even a modified quota formula may be too restrictive. On the one hand, it is 
difficult to anticipate all future circumstances in the context of a transparent and 
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substitution away from the U.S. dollar, we should be cautious in assuming that large industrial   24
simple formula. On the other hand, leaving everything to the circumstances of the 
time may be excessively flexible and may leave IMF lending open to whimsy and 
serendipity.  The difficulty is in balancing the need to provide sufficient resources to 
avoid damaging the international financial system or compromising the welfare of the 
people it is supposed to serve, with the need to provide administrative accountability, 
predictability, and protection from undue interference.  
Any system would have to lie between the two extremes of lending programs 
that are credible but restrictive and flexible but arbitrary. This would most likely 
require introducing an access formula that would endeavour to reflect the sources of 
balance of payments vulnerability both in terms of current account and capital account 
shocks. It would also contain a scale factor in terms of GDP or total trade. Perhaps, 
however, any resulting formula should only be a management tool. It should provide a 
benchmark against which the size of IMF lending to individual countries could be 
judged. Lending above these limits could occur, but, to avoid excessive political 
influences on lending, this would need to be overseen by some form of independent 
review panel. This oversight could be conducted ex ante, but this would generate 
undue delay. A better alternative might be to encourage the Independent Evaluation 
Office to audit cases where lending was significantly in excess of quota limits. 
Systemically the Fund should also focus on how best to catalyse others to lend, either 
private capital markets or aid donors, since this would reduce claims on its own 
resources.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
countries will never need IMF assistance.     25
 
Governance 
The IMF plays a critical role in the international financial system. It disburses some 
money on a concessional basis, and can, in principle, affect the operation of private 
capital markets and the delivery of official capital flows.  It also helps to create rules 
for behaviour in international financial and monetary matters.  Its programs blend 
policy conditionality with adjustment financing. Control over these functions is 
certainly a non-trivial matter for members. 
  To the extent that they provide the bulk of usable resources in the GRA and 
the concessional facilities, advanced creditor economies will demand ultimate control.  
If they are pressured to give it up, they may simply withdraw their support for the 
IMF which relies on them for its resources.  As former British Prime Minister 
Thatcher stated “there was no way in which I was going to put British deposits into a 
bank which was totally run by those on overdraft” (cited in Bakker1996: 52).   
  But the IMF does more than simply provide resources. It establishes the rules 
under which these resources will be provided, as well as the general rules for the 
conduct of the international financial system.  The developing and emerging market 
countries have a clear stake in how the IMF functions, and considerable experience to 
bring to the discussions. They should not be side-lined.  The failure of the IMF to 
balance its financial role with its consultative and systemic management role has led 
to its diminished stature in both. These roles must be reconciled or separated.  
  While the tradition of the IMF has been to seek consensus and thereby dilute 
the degree to which its governance is fractured into an adversarial system, problems 
still arise in building political and governance structures on a voting system nominally 
anchored in economic-based formulas.  From amongst the advanced economies, the   26
US, that has traditionally maintained a dominant role within the IMF, will be reluctant 
to relinquish it. The same may be said of Europe. One can envisage a stand-off that 
will stimy the Fund’s operations.  Changing nothing may consign the Fund to 
irrelevance because of its inability to adapt to new global financial realities, while 
significant changes risk the disengagement of key players upon whose presence the 
system relies.    
  Clearly this dilemma is difficult to resolve. There is no straightforward 
technically superior solution. And even if there were, it would need to be politically 
acceptable, reflecting both the reality of the current distribution of power in the 
international system as well as the distribution of voting power in the Fund’s own 
current governance structure. Options include, first, restoring the significance of basic 
votes to a level that was initially intended, accounting for 10 or 11 per cent of total 
votes. A second option, favoured by G-24 and other outside ‘experts’ (Kenen et al, 
2004) is to reduce the relative votes of European countries and raise those of 
developing and emerging economies. The logic for this is that European countries 
exercise disproportionate influence relative to GDP. Much of their trade is intra 
European, and 12 European countries now share the same currency, the euro. 
European countries could, for example, be divided into two constituencies within the 
Executive Board representing the euro and non-euro areas. European countries may 
resist such proposals and may have to be offered political incentives to entice them to 
agree (Kenen et al, 2004, discuss what these might be). Another related possibility 
would be to revisit the composition of constituencies in order to enhance the influence 
of developing and emerging economies within them. 
  There is little alternative to political compromise. A management and 
governance structure has to be found which allows developing countries to have an   27
effective voice and exert an influence on discussions that affect them but also allows 
advanced economies to retain the degree of control associated with their creditor 
status. The current quota system is unsatisfactory in this regard, and finding an 
alternative has been made more difficult by the other functions that quotas seek to 
achieve. A challenging task has thereby in effect been made impossible. By reforming 
subscriptions, access, and resource adequacy it may become easier to resolve the 
governance issue.  If not, the IMF will likely lose its role in international financial 
management to institutional arrangements that better reflect the current global views 
on power and legitimacy. 
But, of course, current governance structures will constrain reform. The hope must 
be that growing recognition of the deficiencies of the current quota system and the 
implications of these for the future relevance of the IMF will eventually galvanise a 
momentum for reform. 
  
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Following a period of relative neglect, a number of external and internal reports on 
IMF quotas has been written since the end of the 1990s.  However, there has been no 
progress in reforming the quota system. The report of the Quota Formula Review 
Group found little favour within the Executive Board – or indeed elsewhere -  and the 
Fund’s staff were sent away to think again following their initial attempts to come up 
with more acceptable formulas. The whole question of the specific design of quota 
formulas can appear arcane and irrelevant. This is unfortunate since quotas are, to 
quote the IMF Survey, September 2002, the “basic building blocks of the IMF.” 
Subscriptions, drawing rights and votes within the Fund are influenced by quotas.   28
            The existing quota system is deficient in a number of ways. Actual quotas 
differ from calculated ones, so that objectivity and transparency are lost. On important 
occasions quotas miscalculate the demand for IMF resources and they may not ensure 
resource adequacy. Moreover, they provide a distribution of voting rights that many 
countries regard as inappropriate for a global institution. 
  The analysis in this paper emphasises that the debate about quotas in fact cuts 
to the very essence of the Fund’s operations. It should be given a much higher profile 
that it has been. At the same time, given the design flaws of the existing quota system, 
it is difficult to see how current problems can be overcome by simply modifying 
existing quota formulas. As currently constituted, quotas are being asked to do too 
much. One instrument will not achieve all the targets that it has been set. 
  More fundamental reform that goes beyond tinkering with formulas is needed 
if the Fund’s role as the premier international financial institution is to be maintained 
and enhanced. The solution suggested here is to split up the various functions that, at 
present, one quota is being asked to perform. Existing quotas were designed when the 
IMF was envisaged as a credit union. It no longer is and quotas should be reformed to 
reflect this. Countries should contribute to the Fund according to their ability to pay 
based on GDP, and should have access to Fund resources according to their balance 
of payments need. In terms of governance, all countries that are affected by the 
decisions made should be able to contribute a reasonable input into influencing those 
decisions. However, equity needs to be constrained by expediency. Poor countries 
may gain little if a more powerful voice is purchased at the cost of losing the support 
of the advanced economies for the Fund’s operations. It is difficult to envisage the 
Fund’s major shareholders giving up their control. Political pragmatism will dictate 
the outcome.   29
  If quotas are indeed the ‘building blocks’ of the Fund, they are inferior 
building blocks and an IMF which uses them will be relatively unstable and insecure. 
They provide a weak foundation for the Fund’s operations. It is important that the 
quota system is reformed. Putting off decisions and rolling over current arrangements 
is not the answer and will tend to gradually erode the Fund’s role in the world 
economy. Undeniably reform is difficult since it relates to fundamental issues, 
including the lending capacity of the Fund, its governance, and the governance of the 
international financial system. But side-stepping the underlying issues has led to a 
series of ad hoc and possibly ill thought out palliatives. If reforming the IMF is part of 
a new international financial architecture, the Fund needs to address its own financial 


























































ICQs/totalDCCADs ICQs/totalDCCADs>5%GDP ICQs/world exports  31
 
 






Total votes in OECD-dominated constituencies  1537691 
         United States   371743 
         Japan   133378 
         EU single country constituencies   345602 
         OECD-dominated constituencies   686968 
Total votes in Non-OECD-dominated constituencies   621985 
         Non-OECD single country constituencies   193751 
         Non-OECD constituencies with a dominant country   148929 
         Non-OECD constituencies without a dominant country    279305 
Total of all votes (April, 2002)  2159676 
 
Source: Calculated from IMF Annual Reports.   32
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